A b s tr a c t: Recent history has witnessed two huge surprises: first the collapse of communism, and then the unex pected slow-down of post-communist transition. The author claims that the secret of current tensions and drawbacks experienced by Eastern and Central European societies is to be sought in the area of "intangibles and imponderab les", the deep cultural legacy inherited both from the distant pre-modern past of these societies and the more recent syndrome of "fake modernity" imposed by real socialism. The vicious effect of these complex historical influences is described by the concept of "civilizational incompetence" comprising deficiencies in: (a) entrepreneurial culture, (b) civic or political culture, (c) discourse culture and (d) everyday culture. The agents able to undermine and slowly eliminate civilizational incompetence must be sought among the elites most insulated from the impact of real social ism, and at the same time most exposed to the influence of modern, Western culture.
Two huge surprises
The revolutions of 1989 in Eastern and Central Eu rope rank among world-historical events of great est significance. There is basic agreement that -in spite of their mostly non-violent nature -those events must be treated as revolutions, both be cause of their revolutionary scope and the scale of revolutionary mobilization. Thus, first, they have initiated radical and fundamental transformations of all dimensions of society. And, second, they have involved direct and immediate participation of large masses of citizens. That seems enough to put them in line with Great Revolutions of the past. The testimony of a British historian is unam biguous: "The revolutions of 1989 have been real revolutions: popular revolts before which armed governments, one after another, have collapsed; the recovery by nations of lost liberty" (TrevorRoper 1989: 14) . There is also vast consensus that the impact of 1989 is global, with ramifications spreading across the whole human society. As the editor of Daedalus puts it in an issue devoted to "The Exit from Communism": "The year 1989, with its unprecedented happenings in both Central and Eastern Europe, must figure among the few 1 whose consequences have transformed the world". (Graubard 1992: v) .
These revolutions were also among most baffling in history. Nobody has predicted them. Jean Kirkpa trick expresses the mood of common people, poli ticians and scholars alike: "what a fantastic sur prise the collapse of communism was -she ex claims -I believe there has been no greater sur prise in modern history -and we should admit itthan the speed and the totality with which commu nist regimes fell in Eastern Europe and in the so cialist fatherland itself -the Soviet Union" (Kirk patrick 1992: 7).
No wonder that such an amazing feat of world-his torical change, and such a powerful affirmation of human agency -have released widespread enthusi asm, elation, euphoria and unbriddled optimism. Everything seemed so easy and promising. But soon the post-communist societies were to wake up from the happy dream. Outside observers note: "Two years after the Revolutions of 1989 in Cen tral and Eastern Europe the mood has soured" (Chirot 1992: 1) , "pessimism is the attitude of the hour" (Beckert 1992: 2), "neither capitalism, en lightenment, or democracy has proved as pristine or as accessible as everyone wished" (Alexander 1991: 4) . Insiders are even more forthright. Vaclav Havel, one of the architects of the revolution, gives his account "two years after" a telling title: "Paradise Lost", and the picture he paints is dra matic and dismal: "hatred among nationalities, suspicion, racism, even signs of fascism; vicious demagogy, intrigue, and deliberate lying; politick ing, and unrestrained, unheeding struggle for purely particular interests, a hunger for power, un adulterated ambition, fanaticism of every imagin able kind; new and unprecedented varieties of rob bery, the rise of different mafias; the general lack of tolerance, understanding, taste, moderation, reason" (Havel 1992: 6) . Thus, the gloom of the nineties replaced the joy of the eighties. This is the second huge surprise of recent history: why all this is so awfully difficult? What bad for tune keeps us -Eastern and Central Europeansfrom attaining the goal of democratic polity, mar ket economy and open culture, once the proverbial Wall has crumbled? As a sociologist I propose to seek the answer much closer to Earth than fate, destiny or providence. I propose to delve into hu man agency, to look at the people -ultimate mak ers of history, but also ultimate villains of historical failures. And then the secret of the current slow down of post-communist project will become obvi ous: it is ourselves, Eastern Europeans.
The realm of intangibles
The dominant tendency of sociological explana tion is to invoke "hard" institutional or organiza tional facts, economic or political arrangements, material resources, technologies etc. It is more rare to turn attention to the people inhabiting tho se institutions, running organizations, producing and consuming, ruling and obeying, utilizing re sources and applying technologies. It is high time to bring people back into sociological theory, in cluding the theory of post-communism, and to pay much more attention to "soft", human, cultural factors standing in the way of smooth transition.
The central theme of anti-communist revolutions and post-communist changes is grasped by the met aphor of "returning to Europe". An informed ob server notes that "In all the lands, the phrase people use to sum up what is happening is the return to Eu rope" (Ash 1990a: 3). But rarely is it recognized that "Europe" may mean two different things. As Zbigniew Brzezinski insightfully observes the Eu ropean house is not the same as the European home. "House has architectural implications. Home has relational implications. The first implies a structure; the second implies a family" (Brzezins ki 1989: 2). Or in other words, the first refers to "hard" institutional and organizational frameworks (of economy, law, administration, technology), while the second implies "soft" intangibles and im ponderables (of interpersonal bonds, loyalties, val ues, identifications, networks). To re-enter Euro pean house is not the same as being accepted into the European home. The former is easier and quicker: it only requires legal, constitutional chang es and the coordination of the political and econom ic system with that prevailing in Western Europe. The latter is much more demanding; it requires fun damental transformations of mental, cultural, civilizational fabric of society. "We cannot return to Eu rope -says Polish historian -as long as our towns are dirty, our telephones do not work, our political parties are reactionary and parochial, and our men tality Sovietized" (Jedlicki 1990: 41) . It is here, in the "soft" area of intangibles and imponderables that the most dangerous obstacles on the road away from communism, are to be discovered. But before identifying them, we have to take a brief excursus into the realm of general sociological theory. There is one classical sociological author, dealing with earlier Great Revolutions -American and French -to whom we may turn for heuristic hunch es. The lesson Alexis de Tocqueville teaches us is not to underestimate the "soft" factors of habits, mentalities, cultural routines. His focus in the stu dy of successful American democracy is worth quoting at length, as a contrario it may suggest a lot with reference to yet unsuccessful democracies of post-communist Europe: "The manners of the people may be considered as one of the great gen eral causes to which the maintenance of a demo cratic republic in the United States is attributable. I here use the word customs with the meaning which the ancients attached to the word mores; for I apply it not only to manners properly so calledthat is to what might be termed the habits o f the he art -but to the various notions and opinions cur rent among men and to the mass of those ideas which constitute their character o f mind. I com prise under this term, therefore, the whole moral and intellectual condition o f the people" (Tocque ville 1945, vol.I: 12) . This is clearly a bit mixed bag of concepts: including what people do (their con duct), what they think (their mentality), and what they are expected to do and think (their culture). These three levels of human experience should be kept apart. Those sociologists who were heeding Tocqueville's lesson were most often taking either behavioral ap proach, observing activities of societal members; or psychological approach, investigating individual attitudes, motivations, reasons, and at most aggre gating them statistically. When applied to commu nist or post-communist society such approach re sulted in the accounts of "socialist mentality" (Koralewicz and Ziolkowski, 1990) , "social subcon sciousness", (Marody 1987) , "captive mind" (Mi losz 1953), "Homo Sovieticus" (Tischner 1992 ).
I submit that for our present purposes -i.e. inves tigating the dilemmas of post-communist transi tion -the more fruitful approach is cultural: the se arch for underlying patterns for thinking and do ing, commonly shared among the members of soci ety, and therefore external and constraining with respect to each individual member. Tocqueville's message must be delivered from psychologism, and here another sociological classic may be of help: Emile Dürkheim. Following Dürkheims no tion of "social facts" we shall consider cultural pre cepts as telling societal members what ought to be done, either because it is good, or because it is done by most people, or because it has always been done. In other words, culture invokes the au thority of righteousness, normalcy, or tradition, and derives its legitimacy and sanctioning power from these sources. When applied to post-commu nist experience, such approach leads to the ideas of necessary "moral infrastructure of democracy", "civic spirit" (Offe 1991b) , "frames of the mind" (Dahrendorf 1990 ), "discourse of civil society" (Alexander 1989), "habitus" (Bourdieu 1990 ). To use a metaphor, whereas the proponents of psy chological orientation would answer the query ab out the failures of post-communism, by referring to the invisible "wall in our heads" (Nagorsky 1991) , I would claim that there is a more basic "wall in our culture", of which the conduct and mentality of post-communist people are just the symptoms or reflections. This cultural barrier has been raised by several decades of "real socialism", it has acquired considerable autonomy, and there fore retains great potential of persistence long af ter institutional and organizational foundations of "real socialism" have been broken. This is the most vicious legacy that communism has left behind. Let us be more precise. Culture is not something given. It is produced, constructed by the people in the course of collective life, historically accumulat ed and sedimented in tradition. Collective life has various scope: it is carried out in families, groups, local communities, nations, global society. All tho se contexts, or settings have culture-generating potential. There are quite idiosyncratic group cul tures (e.g. professional soldiers), regional cultures (e.g. mountaneers), distinct national cultures (Es kimo, Italian, German), cultures of the empires (e.g. Roman, Aztec), emerging global culture (most obvious in the area of consumer patterns). In the 20th century, in Europe we encounter an other peculiar culture-generating setting of vast scope: the communist bloc (perhaps the closest historical analogy would be the culture of the em pire). Imposing similar institutional and organiza tional forms, similar life-ways, similar ideologies on a number of nation-states of Eastern and Cen tral Europe, and enforcing them for several gener ations, the communist system succeeded in creat ing a common cultural framework, over and above distinct national cultures, and relatively isolated from wider global culture: the unique syndrom of values, rules, norms, codes, standards typical for the bloc as a whole, the bloc culture. Even though there were obvious national varieties in the style in which those cultural precepts were implemented (DDR was not the same as Hungary, Poland was not the same as Czechoslovakia etc.), there were also fundamental, underlying commonalities. Life under communism has produced unique legacy, lasting cultural syndrom.
Unexpectedly and unintentionally this cultural leg acy has turned out to play a double-edged historical role. First, it had a "boomerang effect" on the pro ject of "real socialism" blocking its operation, un dermining its efficiency from within and eventually leading to its collapse. And second, outlasting the conditions that have bred it, and even enhanced to some extent by the immediate effects of prolonged oppositional struggle and revolutionary experi ence ("conspiracy syndrome" and "post-revolu tionary malaise" to be discussed later) it persists after the demise of communism and stands in the way of democratic transition. Strangely enough it has proved to be a subversive force both against to talitarianism and democracy.
The paradox of real socialism and post-communism
To understand this baffling phenomenon, we must look closer at the nature of communist, as well as post-communist experience. There is an interest ing commonality between the project of real so cialism, and the current efforts at democratic tran sition. Ideological embellishments aside, both are the responses to the fundamental inequality in contemporary world; the division between the core and the peripheries. The global society has never been the society of equals. And this is not less true in the epoch of equal formal (legal) sovereignty, when Burkina Faso and the United States have the same, single vote in the UN. Whatever the claims of international law, in the Eastern and Central Europe we have always lived in the factual periph ery (or at most "semi-periphery", as some more generous observers prefer to put it). Anyway, ours have never been the core societies. And the ratio nale of both communist and post-communist pro jects derived from this historical predicament. They were both the attempts at emancipation, at escaping the periphery; they were efforts to bridge the gap between the most developed and the back ward, underdeveloped societies.
The first, socialist project embarked on forced, im posed modernization from above, hoping to es cape from pre-modernity by means of command economy, authoritarian rule, and rigid "thoughtcontrol" (Koestler 1975) . "Because the socialist states were late industrializers, they took a path of development that emphasized state mobilization of resources in order to catch up with early indust rializers" (Chase-Dunn 1992: 30). They were "modernizing societies, which, in seeking to catch up with the more developed, selected and totalized the Jacobin ideological and institutional elements of modernity" (Eisenstadt 1992: 33).
The result was not authentic modernity, but what I would propose to call "fake modernity". By this I mean the incoherent, disharmonious, internally contradictory combination of three components: (a) imposed modernity in some domains of social life (industrialization, urbanization, bureaucrati zation, technological advancement, educational progress etc.), (b) the vestiges of traditional, pre modern society preserved in other domains (pater nalism in politics, barter economy, nepotism, ascriptive and particularistic principles of status etc.), (c) the cultural effects of real socialism, blocking the way to modernity, and incapacitating the system from within, up to its ultimate destruc tion (by a mechanism akin to a self-destroying causal loop). There is the paradox: forced creation of tangible modernity (at least in some domains, and to some degree), was accompanied by the de struction of intangible cultural tissue, indispensable for effective and authentic operation of modernity for the benefit of the people, for their own full en joyment of modernity. As a result, instead of being narrowed down, the gap between the periphery and the core has grown. It is the irony of history, that at the end of the 20th century, in the aftermath of the socialist, modernizing experiment, the East ern and Central European societies have landed deeper in the periphery than before.
The second, oppositional, anti-communist project culminating in the revolutions of 1989, attempts to escape from fake modernity, and perennial peri pheric status by means of radical reconstruction of society by democratic means. It is mainly the flight from real socialism or, as somebody put it meta phorically "the escape from Asia" (Mokrzycki 1991). Shmuel Eisenstadt sees the events of 1989 as "rebellions of protest against a misrepresenta tion of modernity, a flawed interpretation of mo dernity" (Eisenstadt 1992: 33) . And what follows after the revolution is mostly informed by the neg ative rejection of the recent past, rather than any clarity of what is to emerge in the future. "The postcommunist world is now being built by the ne gation of the Leninist experience" (Malia 1992: 58) . But the vicious irony of history works again: instead of reaching authentic modernity, we plun ge into economic crisis, social chaos, political anar chy, anomie and disorganization. It is indeed sad that three years after the victorious revolutions one has to aggree with Vaclav Havel: "Society has freed itself, true, but in some ways it behaves wor se than when it was in chains" (Havel 1992: 6) . The road toward democratic polity, market economy and civil society, or to put it metaphorically enter ing the true European home, rather than merely building the empty scheleton of quasi-European house, is blocked again, this time by the cultural legacy of real socialism, aggravated by the experi ence of the anti-communist struggle and the revo lutions themselves. After two long detours, theo retical and historical, we have to grapple with this cultural legacy more directly. What it consists of, and how it emerged?
The anatomy of civilizational incompetence For a developed, democratic and market society to operate, several resources seem indispensable. Capital, technology, infrastructure, skilled labour force, robust middle class, efficient civil service, professional political elite -would be some obvi ous examples. But there is also a less obvious, un derlying cultural resource which may be called "civilizational competence". By this -in clear anal ogy to what the linguists call the "language compe tence" -1 mean a complex set of rules, norms and values, habits and reflexes, codes and matrixes, blueprints and formats -the skillful and semi-au tomatic mastery of which is a prerequsite for par ticipation in modern civilization. Four substantive sub-categories of civilizational competence coin cide with four main areas of modern, developed society for which they are immediately relevant: economy, polity, social consciousness and every day life. First, there is the enterprise culture, indis pensable for participation in market economy.
Some of its components include: innovative push, achievement orientation, individualistic competi tiveness, rational calculation and the like (cf. McClelland 1961 , Inkeles 1976 ). Second, there is the civic culture, indispensable for participation in democratic polity. Some of its components in clude: political activism, readiness to participate, concern with public issues, rule of law, discipline, respect for opponents, compliance with the major ity and the like (cf. Almond and Verba 1963). Third, there is the discoursive culture, indispens able for participation in free intellectual flow. Some of its components include: tolerance, openmindedness, acceptance of diversity and plural ism, scepticism, criticism and the like (cf. Haber mas 1984 Haber mas and 1987 Haber mas [1981 ). And four, there is the everyday culture, indispensable for daily existence in advanced, urbanized, technologically saturated and consumer-oriented society. Some of its com ponents include: neatness, cleanliness, orderli ness, punctuality, body care, fitness, facility to handle mechanical devices and the like. Civilizational competence understood in this way, is the historical achievement of modernity, which over several centuries has evolved slowly and grad ually in Western societies (Elias 1982) . Of course, even in modern Western democracies, none of its dimensions has been fully and unexceptionally re alized. Larger or smaller enclaves of quite op posite values, habits, and patterns are obviously visible, in economic, political and everyday life. And the twentieth century has witnessed quite long periods of gross violation of civilizational ru les (e.g. in fascist or autocratic regimes). But in pe ripheric societies of Eastern and Central Europe the civilizational competence has never had the chance to evolve. It was clearly undeveloped when these societies started on the road toward commu nist ("fake") modernization. The decades of real socialism not only blocked the appearance of civili zational competence, but in many ways helped to shape contrary cultural syndrom -civilizational in competence. This vicious process operated in all domains of so cial life. The entire social milieu of real socialism acted against the emergence of civilizational com petence. And thus, planned, command economy effectively paralyzed entrepreneurship. Political autocracy alienated the masses and blocked the emergence of citizenship. Imperial domination constrained sovereignty and national identifica tion. Shortages and poverty preempted any con cern with everyday virtues of civility, esthetics and comforts of everyday life.
All this was effected by means of three causal mechanisms. The first was direct indoctrination through socialist propaganda, as well as habitua tion in the ways typical for socialist economic and political practice (this is responsible e.g. for primi tive egalitarianism, demands of welfare and social security from the state, claims to "leading political role" by the working class etc.). The second in volved successful attempts at totalitarian control, by means of coercive state apparatus (resulting e.g. in opportunism, blind compliance, reluctance to take decisions, avoidance of personal responsi bility etc., which together make up the syndrome of "prolonged infantilism" matching the "paternal ism" of the state). The third, and perhaps most crucial, were adaptive, defensive patterns develop ing spontaneously against indoctrination and total itarian control. They took the form of unintended consequences, or "boomerang effects" (e.g. lack of respect for law, institutionalized evasions of ru les, distrust of authorities, double standards of talk and conduct, glorification of tradition, idealization of the West). Some of similar effects were produced by other causal mechanisms appearing together with the growing opposition against the regime. The conspirational struggle and contestation against auto cratic rule, have drawn large segments of society into peculiar cultural settings, unfortunately not much helpful for producing civilizational compe tence. Rather, it strengthened some of the orienta tions listed above. The condition of combat, with the strict borderline between "us" and "them", al lies and enemies, fosters intolerance. Ideological commitment, necessary for successful struggle en courages dogmatism; compromise is treated as treason. The situation of confrontation with the stronger opponent, in the condition of encircle ment by the enemy requires strong, charismatic leadership which rarely bothers with the nuances of democracy. In the immediate aftermath of victorious revolu tion, new factors appear, which -paradoxicallyhelp to preserve the pre-revolutionary legacy, blocking the emergence of civilizational compe tence. First is the widespread anomie or axiologi cal chaos, common disorientation as to the binding norms and values, valid rules, right ways of life. Old patterns have fallen down, new ones have not yet been legitimized. Thrown into uncertainty and devoid of moral guidance, people feel isolated, lonely, and turn their resentments against others. Interpersonal suspicion, hostility, hatred -destroy whatever social social bonds have been left intact by totalitarian rule (and purges under the label of "decommunization" or "lustration" paradoxically engrave this condition even more). Second, the emergence of new life-chances, opportunities to raise social status, by freshly opened access to we alth, power, prestige -generates brutal competi tion, in which stakes are high but rules of the game -undeveloped. Civility, fair play, cooperative atti tudes -do not find conducive ground to put roots. Entirely cynical fights for political power and com plete demoralization of large segments of political elites -are most visible recent illustrations. Third, the rigid social controls, both external and internal are suddenly released. Police force and the judicia ry get disorganized and lose any legitimacy they might still possess. The law is undermined by the claims that its totalitarian origins make it illegiti mate and not binding. If law is considered unjust or anachronic -why should one comply? This is not the helpful condition for establishing the rule of law, as the fundamental principle of democracy. And fourth, there are unintended costs of opening toward the Western world. The flow of consumer mass culture of lowest quality arrives first, before any truly valuable products, and brings pornogra phy and drugs, brutality and mysticism, organized crime and deviant ways of life. The enthusiastic adoption of most superficial symbols of capitalist affluence reminds one of "conspicuous consump tion", "nouveau riche" conduct, and "Great Gatsby syndrome". A strange case of replaying the same scenarios a century later. In this way, the civilizational incompetence, which had originated and evolved (on conducive soil of civilizationally backward societies) in the period of real socialism, then got preserved by the logic of pre-revolutionary conspiracy, and finally has been enhanced by the unintended side-effects of revolu tion -still haunts Eastern and Central Europe. To unravel its composition I will borrow a theoreti cal strategy used recently by Jeffrey Alexander. Applying the late-Durkheimian dichotomy of the sacred and the profane, coupled with Levi-Straussian idea of binary opposites organizing the sym bolic-cultural domain, he analyzes the "discourse of democratic society", underlying the political practices of modern democracies. "We call these sign sets discourses if they meet two conditions. First, they must not only communicate informa tion, structuring reality in a cognitive or expressive way: they must also perform a forceful evaluative task. Binary sets do so when they are charged by the "religious" symbology of the sacred and pro fane" (Alexander 1989: 8 Let us discuss them in more detail, together with their psychological and behavioral implications. The most fundamental and lasting cultural code or ganizing thought and action in the conditions of real socialism is the opposition of two spheres of life: private (personal) and public (official) . As an eminent Polish sociologist testifies: "The life of the average Pole is lived in the two, overlapping worlds: the domain of private contacts and the in stitutional-official sphere" (Nowak 1987:30) . And this observation can certainly be generalized to other "real socialist" societies. Such an opposition appears in a number of guises: "society versus au thorities", "nation versus state", "the people ver sus rulers", "we versus them". The opposition has an unambiguous moral flavor. The private sphere is the domain of the good -of virtue, dignity, pri de; whereas the public sphere is the domain of the bad; of vice, disdain, shame. Activities carried in the private sphere are elevating, while any contact with the public sphere is "polluting" (Alexander 1989). Power centers are perceived as alien and hostile; the government is seen as the arena of con spiracy, deceit, cynicism, or at least stupidity and inefficiency. To "beat the system" to outwit the au thorities, to evade public regulations, rules, lawsis one of the widely recognized virtues, and suc cessful rogues evoke admiration tainted with envy. Excessive egoism, attempts at appropriation of common goods, "grab and run" tactics to safe guard personal well-being, are condoned, or at le ast excused. The state is held responsible for pro viding welfare and security, and blamed for all per sonal failures. On the other hand private connec tions, networks, loyalties -in the job, among friends, at home -are overestimated and ideal ized. The second dichotomy opposes the past and the present. It is typical for the people to glorify and idealize earlier times. The phrase "before the War" (meaning the World War II, in the aftermath of which real socialism was imposed in the sphere of Soviet domination) has always signified the best in all domains of life. And when it came to the op positional struggle and anti-communist revolution their main theme was the return to institutions and traditions of the past, rather than shaping some new forms for the future (e.g. there was always a strong suspicion against "market socialism", "so cial market economy" or in brief so-called "third way", which was ridiculed as the sure way to get to the "Third World"). Jurgen Habermas insightfully grasps this nostalgic climate in his term "rectifying revolutions", observing that in 1989 there is a "to tal lack of ideas that are either innovative or ori ented towards the future" (Habermas 1990: 4f) .
The third of our binary pairs is the opposition of fate and human agency. The world is perceived as operating according to pre-determined rules and the history as running in the pre-established direc tion. Providence, or destiny, or chance, or imper sonal political forces, or inaccessible decision making mechanisms are seen as responsible for hu man fate. People believe they have no say in the running of public affairs, no opportunity to influ ence their own well-being. Therefore they are re luctant to engage themselves in public life, be cause they do not see any realistic way in which it could change anything, and at the same time they clearly perceive the risks and the price of activism. "A fatalistic orientation (...) is thus a learned (and rational) response to a distant, capricious and un responsive power imposed from without" (Thompson/Ellis/Wildavsky: 1990: 3f). The Polish eminent sociologist Stanislaw Ossowski called it "the Lili put syndrome" (Ossowski 1967) . Passivism, apa thy, "wait-and-see" attitude, "free-rider" conduct are other pervasive symptoms of this cultural pat tern.
The fourth and related opposition contrasts two brands of freedom: the negative freedom (freedom from, independence, autonomy), and positive free dom (freedom to, influence, control, mastery, po tency). The cultural bias is clearly toward the earli er. People crave for and cherish liberty, self-deter mination. But this easily degenerates into anarchy, contempt for and evasions of all rules, disrespect for law and morality, widespread permissiveness. Mass activism focuses on defense against real or imagined infractions of freedom, on opposition and contestation, rather than on positive, con structive contributions to the operation of society.
The fifth among binary pairs is the opposition of mythology and realism. There is a tendency to ele vate mythical, religious, ideological thinking over mundane, realistic and rational arguments. People mistake dreams, visions, idealized heroic tradi tions, utopian hopes and aspirations for hard cir cumstances. There is a constant expectation of mir acles -economic, political -the recourse to magi cal strategies and the belief in some supernatural guidance or protection against adversities. The sixth opposition contrasts the West and the East. There is an uncritical glorification of Western way of life, economic and political arrangements, consumer patterns, products, artistic achieve ments. The West is treated in an undifferentiated, stereotyped way, as a synonym of freedom, afflu ence, social security and all imaginable virtues. Any criticism, even invoking internal Western sources, is treated with suspicion as propaganda. Western political leaders are endowed with charis ma they rarely enjoy at home, and even third rate Western consumer products are preferred to local fare. Finally, the seventh opposition counters usefulness with truth. Beliefs, loyalties, attachments are treat ed opportunistically and instrumentally, valid as long as they bring benefits, till they prove effec tive. Truth, faithfulness, straightforwardness -are not considered as autotelic values. Hypocrisy, cyn icism, but also dogmatism and intolerance for the other, reign widely in political and intellectual do main. Stereotypes and prejudices easily get accep tance. Double standards of talk and deeds -offi cial and private -are quite common. It might have been expected that once the institu tional structures of "real socialism" are torn down, the civilizational incompetence will disappear as well. Unfortunately it is not the case. As one knowledgeable researcher testifies: "What is strik ing when we analyze the political attitudes in the 1990 is their surprising, truly structural similarity to the attitudes encountered and described in earli er periods" (Marody 1991: 166) . By some vicious irony of history, the core cultural oppositions and biases typical of socialist societies, together with most of their psychological and behavioral expres sions, have outlived the communist system, and stand in the way of post-communist reforms.
Is there a way out?
Getting rid of the cultural legacy of real socialism, and building of civilizational competence is, I sub mit, the central task facing Eastern and Central European societies in the ninetees. It is a prerequsite, a necessary condition for attaining true mo dernity: authentic democracy, functioning market and open society. The task is onerous and protract ed, but probably attainable. At the close of this ar ticle, let us consider the chances.
The primary question concerns the agents: who can do the task? Culture is omnipresent, permeating all layers of social life. People are fully immersed in culture. How, then, can they escape its pervasive grip? How can they raise above their taken-forgranted cultural milieu, liberate themselves from its constraints, and eventually deconstruct and re form it? The metaphor of raising oneself by the bootstraps immediately comes to mind.
The way out of this seemingly hopeless predica ment will appear if we recognize two facts: first, that culture is not a monolith, but rather a com plex, multidimensional and heterogenous entity, and second, that various groups within the same society are unevenly immersed in common culture.
Thus, to begin with, multiple cultures coexist, overlap at the same historical time, and individuals are reached by a variety of cultural pressures. Some -usually the strongest influences -derive from local cultures, of their group, community, na tion. But some derive from wider cultures, region al, or global. As we remember the culture of real socialism, "bloc culture" is located in-between, it is of intermediate scope. And this means that to gether with its opressive impact, the members of socialist, or presently former socialist societies, are faced with the impact of both their local cultures of smaller scope, e.g. national, regional, and the global culture of modernity, articulated in the core societies of the developed West. The more open is the access to these alternative cultural pressuresof indigenous national traditions, and of the strong ly Westernized global culture, the more easily will societies free themselves from the grip of socialist legacy.
Even before the anti-communist revolution, when socialist societies were relatively insulated from the global culture (though never completely clo sed), the strength of national traditions weakening the socialist culture from within, explains why some of the Eastern and Central European societ ies were more liberal, and less Sovietized than oth ers (Poland or Hungary would be good cases). With their gradual opening to the world, and West ern culture -via mass media, travel, economic ex change -the global culture exerts ever stronger in fluence, undermining the socialist culture from without. Both from the inside, and from the out side, the monopoly of socialist cultural syndrome is eradicated.
Those individuals, or groups, or social categories which are most prone to fall under the impact of al ternative cultural pressures -whereas national or global -will be most insulated from the grip of so cialist culture and they will become the natural avant-garde of cultural deconstruction and reform. The hope of eliminating civilizational incompe tence rests with those, who are able to acquire civi lizational competence either from local, national culture (if it has such content), or from global cul ture, or both. They become leaders of civilization al advancement, spreading out to other groups and social categories.
The second fact is that people are unequally im mersed in culture. Even if we consider only single cultural influence, say of real-socialist cultural syn drome, and ignore the availability of cultural alter natives, various individuals, groups or social cate gories are molded by its impact to uneven degree. Some, for example party apparatchics and propa gandists, nomenklatura, civil servants, secret po licemen, are committed strongest in thoughts and deeds: by ideological creed, political activities, ev eryday practices. They have strongest stakes in the system, and therefore are most vulnerable to its demands. But others may be less so. Think of the clergy, or apolitical farmers, or students, or artists. They seem less dependent, and hence -less vulner able to cultural molding. Such groups, relatively more free from the constraints of socialist environ ment, will provide ready clientele for alternative cultural options -national, or global -if and when they become available.
To sum up, the agents able to reform the perni cious socialist syndrome of civilizational incompe tence, are to be sought among those who are either most exposed to the alternative cultural influences, carrying civilizational competence, or among tho se who are least immmersed in, or least vulnerable to the impact of socialist cultural legacy, carrying civilizational incompetence.
There is probably vast range of variables co-deter mining such a peculiar personal condition. But at the first glance, four seem particularly significant. The exposure to alternative cultural currents is probably highly correlated with two variables: the level of education and cosmopolitan orientation. It is an old wisdom that knowledge is liberating. Ed ucation provides the awareness of cultural options, and instills critical and sceptical attitudes toward any cultural orthodoxy. It is among highly educat ed intellectual elites, that one should look for the forerunners of civilizational competence. Cosmo politan orientation is often linked with education. It means either imagined, mediated, vicarious, or actual, direct experience of foreign cultures, pro viding detached, objective and relativistic perspec tive. It is among educated cosmopolitans, that one is most likely to encounter exemplars of civiliza tional competence.
The insulation from the impact of socialist cultural syndrom, carrying civilizational incompetence, is probably correlated with two other variables. One of them is age. Young people born and raised at the period when socialist system was already crum bling, and approaching its demise, have had the good luck to escape the most efficient and perva sive indoctrination and habituation. Youth gives a chance of independence. And the second variable, often linked with the first is oppositional, contest ing orientation. People who opposed the socialist system, self-consciously raised a mental barrier against its ideological and cultural impact, and they were more sensitive to the evidence of its counter-civilizational implications. Those who coupled their oppositional beliefs with actions, en tering conspiracy or participating in anti-commu nist movements ("Solidarity", Czechoslovakian "Charter", "Democratic Forum" etc.), not only strengthened their attitudes by deeds, but pro voked rejection and stigmatization by the authori ties (discrimination, harassment or outright op pression). In effect they were pushed to the status of outsiders, staying at the margins of official cul ture -which effectively saved them from its grip, and allowed to preserve personal autonomy and self-identity. Thus both categories seem free and ready to acquire civilizational competence, if and when it becomes available.
If this reasoning is correct, social categories mani festing some or all of these traits are most likely to beget the champions of radical cultural decon struction and reform of socialist legacy, the leaders of cultural modernity, bringing much needed civili zational competence. They will constitute a hy pothetical elite, or avant-garde o f civilizational pro gress. But obviously, for the post-communist tran sition to succeed, the reshaping of culture cannot stop at the level of elites, but must reach much wider segments of society, and ultimately perme ate it as a whole. What are the chances for this?
It seems that the same processes which engen dered the elite potential agents able to reshape the culture from within, provide the mechanisms which may help their mission to suceed. The first and most important is the process of globalization. It may be an exeggaration to believe with some ob servers that the communist system was destroyed by the satellite TV dishes, allowing the "demon stration effect" of Western affluence to undermine all remaining legitimacy of "real socialism". But it is certainly true that the irreversible spread of technologies, products, knowledge, images, ideas from the core of contemporary civilization to its peripheries was equally significant in bringing the demise of communism, as it is now in shaping the course of post-communist transition. One crucial domain of globalization is culture, and within cul ture -that particular syndrom of values, norms, codes, and symbols that we call civilizational com petence. It irresistibly spreads from the core to the peripheries. It is smuggled with the images of Western ways of life brought by the media, or by direct, participant observation of tourists, visitors, trade partners, Gastarbeiter. But it also comes in more tangible forms as an effect of economic and political integration. The requirement to adapt lo cal laws, political and administrative institutions, terms of trade, business practices etc. to world standards -undermines the legacy of real socialism more effectively that any ideological appeals. In this sense, the association with EEC brings much more than mere economic benefits. It imposes the framework of civilization. The second mechanism is technological progress. I wish to defend a limited version of convergence theory, to the effect that the advance of technolo gies, and particularly the appearance of high-tech industries and sophisticated consumer products, stimulates the civilizational competence. Modern technologies demand certain standards of organi zation, discipline, diligence, care, and they also pose certain "soft" requirements of neatness, cleanliness, orderliness, esthetics. Is it an accident that computer-chips factory looks so different from smoke-stack metallurgical plant? Or that a mod ern, functional household, equipped with sophisti cated gadgets enforces so different life-styles than those typical of a traditional peasant cottage? With the accellerated technological progress embracing former socialist societies, we can expect significant pressure toward general civilizational advance ment, more effective than moralizing and preach ing. The third promising mechanism is economic priva tization. Placing industry, commerce and services in private hands is not only indispensable for mobi lizing economy and raising overall economic effi ciency, it also has equally important cultural sideeffects. By experience, trial and error, it enforces self-reliance, responsibility, calculation, good or ganization of work, discipline, punctuality etc. It provides the best lesson that those virtues com prised by civilizational competence simply work, turn out to be beneficial and bring measurable profit. Is it an accident that a private grocery store opened in any Eastern European town is so strik ingly more civilized than earlier, state-run outlets. Well-organized, efficient enterprises make up is lands of modernity, the exemplars of civilizational competence from which it may spread by imitation to the whole economy, including the huge stateowned enterprises, destined to stay around for some more time due to practical constraints. In this, economic area, the role of multinational cor porations or joint ventures, establishing the out posts, enclaves of modern business culture in for mer socialist countries is hard to overestimate. They bring with them, and impose ready-made patterns of modern, civilized business organiza tion, management and labor. Thus, whereas indig enously developed or imported, the private enter prise is an efficient channel through which civiliza tional competence evolves and spreads. And the final mechanism is perhaps the most ex acting of all: political democratization. Either by importation of "well-tested" political solutions (as Lech Walesa used to plead), or by slow develop ment of indigenous democratic institutions, the ef ficiency of government and administration will surely be raised. And, what is even more impor tant from our present perspective, the political re form will enforce civilizational competence. The constitutional framework of democracy, will turn old political habits of autocracy, nepotism, favorit ism, paternalism, particularism, dogmatism, intol erance etc. -into maladaptive and dysfunctional ways, guaranteeing political failures rather than successes. They will slowly be replaced by their op posites, fitting the new democratic polity. As Claus Offe observes: "By instilling the appreciation and a favorable attitude toward the routines of demo cratic participation and representation into their respective social domains, and also by developing a strong interest in their own respective role in the making of public policies -independent trade uni ons, employer's associations, leagues of farmers, professional associations, political parties etc., can reinforce the popular consensus that supports the constitution and the practice of democratic gov ernment" (Offe 1991a: 9) . The rooting of civilizational competence in politi cal institutions and political practices, both at the central and local levels, will bring the ultimate vic tory of modernity, but one which will be particular ly hard to win. First of all, because it requires a long time, and time seems scarce in post-commu nist world. As Bronislaw Geremek observes "De mocracies are built only over time, through the forming and functioning of democratic institutions (...) The process is one of gradual maturation, both of democracy itself and of people in the ways of democracy" (Geremek 1992: 15) . And Ralf Dahrendorf is even more pessimistic, projecting the appearance of rooted democratic tissue in no less than sixty years (Dahrendorf 1990 ). The sec ond reason for difficulty is that the new democratic constitution of society must be established through democratic procedure, by the people most of whom are not yet democrats at heart, still trapped in the legacy of civilizational incompetence. The hope to break this vicious circle must rest with tho se initially small elites of citizens -highly educat ed, cosmopolitan, young at least in spirit, ready to contest established ways -who have already es caped the grip of "real socialism" or who have nev er succumbed to that in the first place. And the hope must also be placed in those universal mecha nisms and processes, which embrace the global so ciety and engulf the post-communist enclave in their salutary influence. At the face of it, it all looks like an extremely hard job for several generations. But in quite recent past we have witnessed totally unpredictable turns of history, two "huge surprises". Let us hope that the success of post-communist transition will pro vide us with another great surprise. After all, it is certainly more probable than the fall of commu nism seemed just a few years ago.
